an ARDL approach by Arshad, Muhammad
1 
 
 
 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
PAKISTAN: AN ARDL APPROACH 
 
By 
 
ARSHAD, Muhammad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
 
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
2010  
  
 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
PAKISTAN: AN ARDL APPROACH  
 
By 
 
ARSHAD, Muhammad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
2010 
 
Professor KANG, Younguck  

 i 
 
 
 
 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
PAKISTAN: AN ARDL APPROACH 
 
By 
 
ARSHAD, Muhammad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth is 
widely debated in the literature. However, there has been not much attempts to 
verify this relationship systematically. By using the autoregressive distributed 
lag model framework, an attempt is made for identifying the relationship using 
the Pakistan’s case. This study finds that, at least for Pakistan, fiscal 
decentralization is positively related with economic growth. Such findings 
may imply that fiscal decentralization could be used as a vehicle for achieving 
long-term economic growth in Pakistan’s case.  However, it is also suggested 
that factors such as over-dependence of provincial governments on centre, 
undefined functional and tax responsibilities, limited and unaffected tax base 
for provincial and local governments may undermine the full benefits of fiscal 
decentralization.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
   More than past two decades, process of decentralization is debated widely in 
literature. Most countries are making attempts for challenging monopoly power of central 
governments in decision-making process that motivates central governments to transfer the 
authority of performing certain functions by lower level.  
    Fiscal decentralization (FD), transfers of fiscal assignments from central 
government to lower level of governments1, is heart of any devolutionary exercise. Without 
appropriate degree of FD no authority can be devolved. The basic concept involves 
transferring of funds to sub-national governments according to their due share along with 
authority and flexibility to spend the funds as per local priorities.   
   The main economic argument for FD may be that it increases economic 
efficiency as sub-national governments have more information about the preferences and 
tastes of their constituents. Oates (1993) argued that when goods and services are provided to 
local constituents in accordance with their tastes and preferences as compared to centrally 
determined uniform levels, it increases the social welfare. The process of FD also leads to an 
improvement in governance, as giving more authority and flexibility for spending funds 
makes local governments fully responsible for the judicious and cost effective utilization of 
funds. It also makes local government accountable for their performance especially in 
relation to service delivery. Thus adequate degree of FD is a necessary pre-requisite for the 
success of local government system.  
                                                          
1 As defined by Xie et. al (1999), p. 228 
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    Contrary to that some researchers disagree with this proposition2. For example, 
Tanzi (1995) pointed out that generally taxpayers do not have sufficient political power or 
information for putting pressure on local policymakers for efficient decision making. He 
further pointed out that particularly in developing countries, state or local politicians are 
generally more corrupt than national ones. As a result of these situations or circumstances, the 
policy decision of FD may have less than optimal result.    
   In Pakistan, prior to independence 3  the devolutionary reforms have been 
started by non- representative regimes of British. Later, these reforms were carried out by 
three military regimes 4 . However, it has been learned that the devolutionary reforms 
implemented by military regimes involve transferring of certain powers and functions from 
provinces5 to local governments but often they strengthen the central government.  
   Decentralization process involves transferring of a large number of functions 
and powers6 from central to provincial and from provincial to local governments. However, 
in case of Pakistan, before promulgation of Local Government Ordinance, 2001 and 
introduction of Legal Framework Order, 2002 the functions and powers are generally 
allocated in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to only two tiers of 
governments – the Federal and Provincial. There is a need to decentralize some functions and 
powers to sub-national level. The last military regime, following the norms of other two 
military regimes, in early 2000 started devolutionary exercise wherein inter-alia, local 
governments have been recognized as a third or lower tier. This reform transfers sufficient 
fiscal powers to lower tiers of government.  
                                                          
2  see Tanzi, (1995); Hemming and Spahn (1997); Leterlier (2003) etc. for detail. 
3 Pakistan got independence from British in August, 1947.  
4  i.e. General Ayub Khan regime (1958~1969), General Zia ul Haq regime (1978~1988) and General Pervez 
Musharaf’s regime (Oct. 1999~Nov. 2007) 
5 Pakistan has four provinces - Sindh, Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa(former NWFP) and Baluchistan. 
6 such as political, administrative and financial powers 
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   Although theoretical models of FD provide arguments for its relationship with 
economic growth but its direction is less clear-cut. On the one hand, theory argued that FD is 
positively related with economic growth through improved supply of public goods by 
considering diverse local preferences and inter-jurisdictional competition among sub-national 
governments which provides incentives for product innovation that enhance consumers as 
well as producers efficiency. On the other hand, theory also argued that it is negatively 
related with economic growth as inter-jurisdictional tax competition leads to higher regional 
disparities and corruption that leads to undersupply of public goods.  In addition to that 
empirical validations for theoretical foundations are also ambiguous. For example, Xie et. al. 
(1999), Thieβen (2000) and Desai, et. al (2003) found positive association while Davoodi and 
Zou (1998) and Zhang and Zou (1998) found negative relationship between FD and 
economic growth. Thus, empirical analysis provides an opportunity not only to determine 
direction of this relationship for Pakistan but also encourage to estimate its impact on 
economic growth. 
   Present study is unique in the sense that previous studies generally used simple 
OLS technique for evaluation of relationship; however, present study uses a recently 
developed technique of Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) for determining long-
run association between FD and economic growth. Further, a very few studies have so far 
been made for Pakistan’s context. For example, Cheema and Mohmand (2003), Chema et. al 
(2004) and Zaidi (2005) examined the process of decentralization in historical context; Pasha 
and Pasha (2000) identified major issues of FD in relation with devolution plan of 2000. 
Whereas, Malik et. al (2006) empirically examined this impact for Pakistan by using simple 
OLS technique.  
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   The reason for determining relationship between FD and economic growth is 
three fold: First, the objective of any devolution exercise particularly devolution of fiscal 
powers to lower level is to improve efficiency in public sector’s resource allocation that leads 
to economic growth. Second, it is one of the objectives of government to implement policies 
that augment income of the masses and last, measuring economic growth is easier than other 
indicators [Zhang and Zou (2001)].  
   The present study has certain limitations. Ideally, long-run relationship should 
be examined by using the fiscal data of three tiers of government i.e. federal, provincial and 
local governments. But unfortunately, there is not sufficient data available for public finance 
at local government level. Therefore, the analysis is limited to two tiers of government i.e. 
federal and provincial governments. Further, national GDP is used instead of provincial GDP 
as data for the later is not available. Furthermore, there was an intention to use panel data for 
analyzing impact of FD on economic growth. But due to lack of panel data particularly 
growth data at provincial level, it forced to use time series for analysis. 
   Besides determining the long-run relationship between two variables of 
interest, present study also reviews socio-economics condition of Pakistan; examines inter-
governmental fiscal relation in the context of Constitution (1973); analyzes the fiscal position 
of Pakistan Economy since 19727; reviews theoretical linkages of FD and economic growth; 
determines the long-run relationship between two variables of interest; estimates long-run 
impact and short-run dynamics of FD; and provides policy implications. 
  The study progresses as follows: Chapter 2 briefly examines the 
decentralization process in Pakistan. Theoretical links and empirical literatures are reviewed 
in Chapter 3.  Methodology, data descriptions and empirical results are explained in Chapter 
4. Last chapter is devoted for conclusion and policy implications. 
                                                          
7 The main reason for starting analysis from 1972 is that after 1971’s war, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was 
separated from West Pakistan (now Pakistan). So time series data after 1971 relates to Pakistan. 
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Chapter 2 
Fiscal Decentralization in Pakistan∗ 
   
   Devolution is a gradual process of transferring powers and resources from 
federal government to its lower level like provinces, districts and tehsils/towns. 
Decentralization of administrative and political powers alone will not be effective unless the 
financial powers from central to provinces are transferred.  
   Pakistan became an independent state in August, 1947; since then no vigorous 
efforts had been made to distribute administrative, political and financial powers amongst 
federal, provincial and local governments except the three military regimes who used 
decentralization as a strategy to strengthen their governments. The last military regime started 
the devolutionary reforms in the early 2000 by following the principle of subsidiary, whereby 
all functions that can effectively be performed at the local level are gradually transferred to 
them. This meant that functions which were previously handled by provincial governments 
are devolved to local governments. 
   In this chapter FD process adopted by Pakistan is reviewed in the following 
context: institutional arrangement; inter-governmental fiscal relation in the context of 
Constitution (1973); functional responsibility assigned by the Constitution (1973) to federal 
and provincial governments; funds transfer mechanism; overall fiscal position of Pakistan’s 
economy during the period under review along-with composition of revenue and expenditure 
at provincial and federal level; and extent of present FD reforms. 
  The institutional factors like legal and political system, socio-economic 
                                                          
∗ The discussion on this chapter is generally based on articles of Zaidi (2005); Cheema et. at (2004) and World 
Bank (2000).  
 
 
6 
 
conditions etc. are very important for analyzing FD effectively. The institutional background 
decides the shape of inter-governmental fiscal relation and outcome of reform process. 
Pakistan’s institutional arrangements are explained in the following paragraphs in two broad 
perspectives – overall economic and social development and prevailing legal system. 
2.1  Pakistan’s Socio-Economic Situation and Legal System: 
   Pakistan economy has witnessed continues growth over more than 4.5%.  The 
real GDP increased by an average growth rate of 6.8% during 1960s, it declined to 4.6% in 
1990s and then picked up momentum by increasing at an average rate of 5.0% in 2000s (see 
Table 2.1). Interestingly, in 2005, Pakistan economy with a growth rate of 9.0% was 
recognized as 2nd fastest growing economy of Asia after China.  
   It is obvious from the Table 2.1 that the growth rate in three military regimes 
(i.e. 1960s, 1980s and 2000s) are much higher than politically democratic regimes. Under 
military regimes, continuation of policies might be reason for this higher growth. In this 
context Zaidi (2005) argued that since growth rates are higher under military regimes this 
implies that achieving high growth rates for the economy would be to maintain military 
regime. 
Table 2.1: Decade-Wise Selected Economic Indicators 
Year Real GDP Growth (%)
Fiscal Deficit
(% of GDP) 
Tax to GDP 
Ratio (%)
FDI 
(% of GDP) 
1960s 6.8 2.1 - 0.30 
1970s 4.8 5.3 - 0.11 
1980s 6.5 7.1 13.8 0.36 
1990s 4.6 6.9 13.4 0.86 
2000s 5.0 4.3 11.9 1.91 
2009 2.0 4.3 10.5 2.23 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey and SBP Annual Reports various issues 
   A sound fiscal position is vital for achieving macroeconomic stability that has 
been recognized as critical factor for sustainable economic growth. For Pakistan, fiscal deficit 
remains one of the problems for its economy since its inception (see Table 2.1). The highest 
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fiscal deficit was recorded in 1980s. If we compare political regimes with military regimes, 
we may observe that fiscal deficit was higher in former except 1980s (i.e. in General Zia 
regime). Tax to GDP ratio remains almost stagnant during 1980s and 1990s, thereafter, it 
showed a declining trend. The shrinking tax base for Pakistan’s economy is mainly due to 
either tax evasion or loopholes in taxation policies/system.  
   Foreign investment has played an important role in developing countries like 
Pakistan for providing required macroeconomic stability. For Pakistan, the private external 
flows are mainly come from Foreign Direct Investment. It has shown an increasing trend 
particularly in last three decades. In absolute terms, it increased from $3.0 million in 1960 to 
more than $5.41 billion in 2008 whereas in percentage term it is as high as 1.91% in 2000s as 
compared to other decades. 
  One of the widely used indicators for economic development is per capita 
income. Meier defines economic development as “the process whereby the real per capita 
income of a country increases over a longer period of time”8. In Pakistan, it shows an 
increasing trend from 1985 to 2009. The average Pakistani in 1985 had US$370 (see Table 
2.2); however, by 2009 this estimate has increased to US$1,046 which implies that in terms 
of per capita Pakistan’s economy has shown improvement. 
   Pakistan with a population of 163.8 million in mid-2009 is the 7th most 
populous country in the World9. More than 128 million people have been added since 1951. 
However, with accelerated efforts 10  of government and changing in socio-economic 
conditions, a decline in fertility and birth rate have been observed during 1990s that reduces 
the population growth to 2.5% in 1995 and further to 1.87% in 2009 (see Table 2.2).  
                                                          
8 cited in Sharma and Bhandari (2005), p. 16. 
9 This ranking is made on the basis of data provided in CIA World Factbook (for further details see 
“http://www.infoplease.com/world/statistics/most-populous-countries.html”). 
10 like initiation of National Population Planning Programs 
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   Education is vital for socio-economic development of a country. It builds 
human capital and accelerates economic growth through imparting knowledge, developing 
skills and establishing a creative strength for a society. In 1980s, about one-third of Pakistanis 
were literate; however, due to devoted efforts of government this rate has reached to 56% by 
2009.  
Table 2.2: Selected Development Indicators 
Year 
Per 
Capita 
Income 
(US $) 
Population 
Literacy
Rate 
(%) 
Un-
employ-
ment 
Rate 
(%) 
Poverty 
(Headcount)
Life 
Expectancy 
at Birth 
(years) 
Infant 
Mortality
Rate  
(per 000)(Million) 
Growth
(%) 
1985 370 95.0 3.1 28.8 3.7 - 57 126.7 
1995 490 121.5 2.5 39.6 5.4 - 61 - 
2000 526 136.7 2.6 47.1 6.0 34.5 63 85.0 
2005 733 151.1 1.9 53.0 7.7 23.9 65 82.0 
2009 1,046 163.8 - 56.0 5.2 36.1 65 70.2 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey and SBP Annual Reports various issues 
  Employment is more of a social issue than an economic one as it directly 
affects the lives of every individual in a society. Proper employment is a necessity for all. 
However, in Pakistan, un-employment remains a problem and in 1985, about 4% of total 
labor force did not find a job (see Table 2.2). This rate has shown persistent increase up to 7.7% 
in 2005. Thereafter, due to government’s employment generation programs this rate reduced 
to 5.2%.  
   Inadequate income, health and education, low standard of livings and lack of 
opportunities and choices for human development are the different aspects of poverty. Last 
military government’s vigorous efforts to improve standard of livings and reduce poverty 
have shown positive result of the policies made during 2000-2005 (see Table 2.2). However 
global economic recession, lower economic growth, reduction in subsidies and high inflation 
are the main reasons for increase in Poverty in 2009.  
 
 
9 
 
   Improved life expectancy at birth is also one of the important factors for socio-
economic development. In this front, through vigorous policy efforts Pakistan has improved 
life expectancy for its people from 57 years to 65 years (see Table 2.2). On the other hand, the 
infant mortality rate has declined from 126 per thousand persons to 72.2 per thousand persons 
in 2009.   
 Federation of Pakistan is governed under the Constitution (1973) and all 
amendments to it since then. The Constitution (1973) specifies functions of the federal 
government and of the provincial governments. While the provinces had Constitutional status, 
the existence of local government was not formally part of the Constitution (1973) till 17th 
amendments made in 2003 wherein existence of local government is partially protected. 
Before amendments, an interim arrangement was made by last two military regimes for 
recognition of local governments as third tier of government through promulgation of Local 
Government Ordinances of 1979, 1980 and 2001 wherein some of the powers and 
responsibilities were delegated from provincial governments to local governments.   
2.2 Inter Governmental Fiscal Relations: 
  Inter-governmental fiscal relation has been debated widely in the area of 
public finance. It determines effectiveness of provincial and federal finances and specifies 
functional (i.e. expenditure) responsibilities for them. It also identifies the taxation authority, 
describes degree of control over resources and provides revenue transfers arrangement from 
one level of government to another [World Bank (2000)]. 
  How the Constitution (1973) and subsequent Ordinances fix the functional 
responsibility and taxation powers among various level of governments and mechanism to 
share revenue between federal and provincial governments are discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  
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  The Fourth Schedule to the amended Constitution (1973) broadly allocates 
functional responsibilities among different levels of governments. It defines areas of 
functional responsibility and taxation powers for the federal, provincial and local 
governments. In general, the Constitutional distribution of functions is in line with broad 
principles of fiscal assignments such as efficiency, cost effectiveness etc. (see Annex – I for 
details).  
   The Fourth Schedule basically consists of Federal Legislative List and 
Concurrent List. The former describes exclusive responsibilities of federal government to 
undertake functions mostly relating to service delivery and regulatory in nature, while the 
latter outlines the functions that can be performed either level of government jointly or 
separately. The functions relating to service delivery includes defense, external affairs, 
communications and transportation like postage, telephone, TV, railways, ports and shipping 
etc (see Table 2.3). The functions contains in Concurrent List are mostly relating to 
population planning, tourism, curriculum development etc. The remaining functions which 
are not exclusively assigned to either government are assumed to be delivered by provincial 
government.  
   The legislative responsibility of either level of government with actual 
allocation of functions is compared in Table 2.3. From the Table 2.3, it is observed that most 
of the functions which are placed on Concurrent List and functional reasonability of both 
federal and provincial governments are actually performed by federal government. The 
reason for undertaken these assignments by federal government might be weak financial and 
technical base of provincial governments. On the same ground, it is also observed that a large 
number of legislative functions assigned to local government are actually performed by 
provincial governments.  
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Table 2.3: Legislative Responsibilities and Actual Allocation of Functions  
among Federal, Provincial & Local Governments Prior to 2001 
 
Legislative 
Responsibilities Services 
Actual 
Allocations of 
Functions 
Federal 
Government 
Defense  
External affairs and foreign aid 
Post, telegraph, telephone, radio and TV 
Currency and foreign exchange 
Institutes for research 
Nuclear energy 
Parts and aerodromes 
Shipping, air service, railways, and national 
highways 
Stock exchanges 
Geographical and meteorological survey 
Censuses 
Mineral oil and natural gas 
Industries 
Federal 
Government 
Federal/Provincial 
Government 
Population planning 
Electricity (except KESC) 
Curriculum development, syllabus planning, and 
centres of excellence 
Tourism  
Social welfare and employment exchanges 
Vocational/Technical training 
Historical sites and monuments 
Federal/Provincial 
Government 
Provincial 
Governments  
Law and order, justice 
Highways and urban transport 
Agricultural extension and distribution of inputs 
Irrigation and land reclamation 
Secondary and higher education 
Provincial 
Governments 
Local 
Governments 
Curative health 
Land development 
Primary education 
Preventive health 
Farm-to-market roads 
Water supply, drainage, and sewerage 
Provincial/Local 
Governments 
Link roads 
Intra-urban roads 
Street lighting 
Solid waste management 
Fire fighting 
Parks, playgrounds 
Local 
Governments 
        Source: Zaidi (2005), p. 201. 
 
     The Constitution (1973) also specifies taxation powers of federal and 
provincial governments. The details of how taxation powers have been assigned to federal 
and provincial governments under the Constitution (1973) are given at Annex-II. The striking 
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feature of allocation of taxation powers is that all broad and buoyant bases are assigned to 
federal government and residuals are left for provincial governments. For example, federal 
government can generate tax revenue proceeds for financing its expenditure from income tax, 
corporate tax, sales tax, and custom duties etc. which are more broad and buoyant source. 
Surprisingly, the federal government is assuming more and more taxation authority either 
directly or indirectly11 that gradually limits the provincial revenue base. This situation is 
further deteriorated as some of the buoyant sources of provincial revenue were abolished 
either for religious reasons12 or on policy grounds13. 
   The Local Government Ordinances defines the areas where local government 
can assume its taxation powers that generally include taxation powers of local government on 
entertainment activity such as cinemas, dramatic and theatrical shows, tolls on roads and 
bridges, school fee and advertisement etc. (see Annex – III for details). 
   Public finances in Pakistan are characterized by large vertical fiscal 
imbalances between the federation and provincial governments mainly due to highly skewed 
taxation powers towards federal government and related slow growth of the provinces’ own 
revenue. As it is obvious from the Table 2.4 that more or less two third of total resources are 
generated by federal government because all major and productive tax bases are in their 
domain. As a result, provinces are relied heavily on revenue transfers from federal 
government for meeting their expenditures. It hinders provincial autonomy in fiscal decision-
making and makes policy makers unaccountability towards their constituents [World Bank 
(2000)].   
 
                                                          
11 by imposing federal taxes on provincial tax bases 
12 like excise duty on opium /liquor. 
13 such as capital gain tax. 
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Table 2.4: Vertical Fiscal Imbalances (in %) 
 1979-80 1985-86 1997-98 2005-06 2008-09 
 Exp. Rev. Exp. Rev. Exp. Rev. Exp. Rev. Exp. Rev.
Federal 79.6 72.8 77.0 69.3 74.6 66.6 68.3 61.6 70.0 62.8
Provincial 20.4 27.2 23.0 30.7 25.4 33.4 31.7 38.4 30.0 37.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Author’s calculation  
  Pakistan has a federal structure. It collects resources through fiscal instruments 
and shares these resources with its federating units according to a pre-defined formula. 
International best practices suggest that countries are used to share its resources on multiple 
bases such as population, poverty, backwardness, revenue generation etc. For Pakistan, 
population and location of natural resources form the main basis of fiscal transfers. 
  Being a federal type of government, major resources are generated by federal 
government which later has to be apportioned between federation and provinces and further 
amongst the provinces. For this purpose, the Constitution (1973) allows President of Pakistan 
to form a Commission called National Finance Commission (NFC) with a mandate to 
examine and review resource generation pattern, needs of federation and its federating units 
and recommend methodology for fair distribution of resources generated by the federal 
government. The Constitution (1973) also specifies compositions of ‘Divisible Pool’ which 
includes: 
i) Income taxes and corporation taxes but it does not include taxes  on 
remuneration given from Federal Consolidated Fund; 
ii) Taxes imposed on sales and purchases of domestic and imported goods; 
iii) Export duties on cotton and others that the President may specify from 
time to time; and 
iv) Such other taxes as the President may specify from time to time. 
 
   The NFC is supposed to announce an Award every five years. However, Table 
2.5 reveals that this was not the case. A gap of seventeen years has been observed between 
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1974 and 1990 Award. Although, attempts were made to form the NFC but all such initiatives 
failed due to some political reasons. Table 2.5 also highlights changing composition of 
divisible pool over the time. For example, the Award of 1974 distributes the resources placed 
in divisible pool at a ratio of 80 : 20 between federation and provinces respectively. For 1996 
NFC Award, it was fixed as 62.5 : 37.5.  
  Table 2.5: Historical Arrangements of Revenue Sharing between 
Federal and Provincial Governments (in % age) 
 
 
Raisman 
Award 
1951 
NFC 
Award 
1962 
NFC 
Award 
1964 
NFC 
Award 
1970 
NFC 
Award 
1974 
NFC 
Award 
1991 
NFC 
Award 
1996 
Income Tax 50 50 65 80 80 80 37.5
Wealth Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.5
Capital Value Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.5
Sales Tax 50 60 65 80 80 80 37.5
Central Excise Duty 
On: 
   
   Tea 50 60 65 80 -- -- --
    Tobacco 50 60 65 80 0 80 37.5
    Jute and Cotton 62.5 100 65 80 80 80 37.5
    Sugar 0 0 0 0 0 80 37.5
    Natural Gas 0 0 0 0 100 100 100
    Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.5
Export Duty on Cotton 0 0 0 0 80 80 --
Import Duties 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.5
Estate and Succession 
Duty on Agri. 
-- 100 100 100 -- -- --
Duties on Capital Value 
of Immovable 
-- 100 100 100 -- -- --
Surcharge on Natural 
Gas 
-- -- 0 0 100 100 100
Royalty on Natural Gas -- -- 0 0 100 100 100
Royalty on Crude Oil -- -- 0 0 100 0 100
Source: Zaidi (2005) 
  The 6th NFC constituted by the President first in 2000 and then re-constituted in 2003. 
However, consensus on distribution of Award was not made and it was decided that the 
President may announce a just and equitable Award. The President passed Distribution of 
Revenues and Grants-in-Aid (Amendment) Order, 2006 which fixes the yearly provinces 
shares in the net proceeds of taxes and duties.  The details of share of provinces in the 
divisible pool are given in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6: Share of Provinces in the Divisible Pool 
Financial Year % Share 
2006 – 07  41.50 
2007 – 08 42.50 
2008 – 09 43.75 
2009 – 10 45.00 
2010 – 11 and onward 46.25 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad 
   There are different perspectives of provinces and federal government about the 
vertical distribution of revenues. Provinces are demanding 50% of the divisible pool whereas 
federal government is emphasizing for sharing of revenues on the basis of President’s Order 
of 2006. There is also difference of opinion about the horizontal distribution amongst the 
provinces like Punjab 14  is advocating population based distribution, Sindh wants the 
distribution on the basis of population, backwardness and revenue collection in the ratio of 
77.5%, 12.0% and 10.5% respectively. Baluchistan pleads that revenues may be distributed as 
80%, 10% and 5% for population, inverse population density and revenue collection basis 
respectively. Whereas Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formally NWFP) wants revenues to be 
distributed like 80%, 19% and 1% on the basis of population, backwardness and inverse 
population density respectively. 
2.3 Overall Fiscal Position: 
   The public finances in Pakistan were not properly managed prior to 1999 as 
total expenditures held beyond the available resources. Though after 1999, it was above the 
revenue but the revenue-expenditure gap was showing a declining trend. The overall fiscal 
deficit remains within the range of 5% to 10% of GDP. However in late 1990s it shows a 
squeezing trend (see Figure 2.1). The underlying issue is that Pakistan should increase 
sufficient revenue for meeting expenditure requirements of all levels of government. 
 
                                                          
14 Largest province of Pakistan in terms of population 
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Figure 2.1: Overall Pakistan’s Fiscal Position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Economic Surveys (various Issues) 
     The total revenue to GDP ratio generally showed a declining trend. 
Initially it increased gradually from 16% in 1982 to 19.2% in 1992. Thereafter, it 
continuously declined up to 13.3% in 2001, except 1996 and 1998 wherein it increased 
slightly. During 2002 to 2009, it fluctuated from 13.7% to 14.6%. The reasons for continuous 
fiscal imbalances may be weak tax effort coupled with overdependence on indirect taxes 
which creates excess burden of taxation, narrow tax base, inefficient tax administration, 
complex tax laws and procedures, and widespread culture of corruption and tax evasion.  
   Since 1980s and mid 1990s, share of current expenditure is rising mainly 
because of extraordinary rise in debt servicing. Further, Pakistan economy is also 
characterized by a defence economy as a large chunk of resources has been spent on defense 
or defence related activities. On average, the share of defence expenditure on total 
expenditure is 23% and interest payment share is 21.8%. Resultantly, total expenditure 
relative to GDP grew on average by 20% per annum.  
   Table 2.7 provides an overview that how the government of Pakistan present 
its consolidated provincial and federal public finances which consists of government 
( i
n 
%
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expenditure and revenues, figures on development expenditure and amount of fiscal deficit 
along with its financing sources. It may be noted that in 25 years, there were many structural 
reform programs adopted by various political and non-political governments but very small 
change have been observed in the composition of resources. Even in some cases the position 
is much deteriorated as before. For instance, in case of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
declined from 13.3% in 1981-82 to 10.1% in 2008-09.  
Table 2.7: Summary of Public Finance, 1981/82 and 2008/09 
Major Heads 
1981/82 2008/09 
Rs. 
(Million)
% of 
GDP 
Rs. 
(Million) 
% of 
GDP 
Total Revenue (i+ii) 51,930 16.0 1,809,240 13.8 
Federal 48,537  1,66,238  
Provincial 3,393  147,002  
i) Tax Revenue 43,003 13.3 1,317,857 10.1 
Federal  40,368  1,251,462  
Provincial 2,635  66,395  
   ii)  Non Tax Revenue 8,927 2.6 491,383 3.8 
Federal 8,169  410,776  
Provincial 758  80,607  
Total Expenditure (a+b+c) 71,013 21.9 2,391,491 18.3 
   a)  Current Expenditure 44,544 13.7 1,875,832 14.3 
Federal 34,245  1,358,832  
Provincial 10,299  517,000  
   b)  Development  
Expenditure 26,459 8.2 516,629 3.9 
c)  Net lending to Public 
Sector Enterprises 1,909  -970  
Statistical Discrepancy 0  0  
Overall deficit -17,174 5.3 -582,251 4.3 
Financing (net) 17,174  582,251  
External (net) 5,345  165,216  
Domestic 6,313  417,035  
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 1981/82 and 2008/09 issue, Islamabad 
   The composition of federal tax revenue till 1999 is almost stagnant (see Figure 
2.2). In 1979, federal government generated 88% revenue from own resources (69% from tax 
and 19% from non-tax revenue) and transferred remaining 12% to provinces. This 
composition has changed in 1999 and further in 2009 wherein one fifth and one fourth of 
total federal revenues were transferred to provinces respectively. 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on SBP Annual Reports various issue 
   An interesting feature of federal revenue is that the tax revenue is far greater 
than from non-tax revenue and that indirect taxes are many times larger than direct taxes (see 
Figure 2.3). Within the category of indirect taxes, custom and federal excise duties have been 
dominated and provided the largest sources of income to federal government till 1989. 
Revenue from custom and federal excise duties together constitutes 73% and 59% of total tax 
revenue in 1979 and 1989 respectively. However, at present sales tax becomes the largest 
source of revenue for the government (39% of total revenue in 2009). Revenue generated 
from sales tax alone is equal to the total revenue generated by federal government from direct 
taxes. 
   Another interesting feature is that reliance of provincial revenue on federal 
government has substantially increased.  This reliance was as high as 68% of total revenue in 
1999 (see Figure 2.4). The composition of 1979 provincial revenue receipts consisted of 51% 
of revenue generated from their own resources (16% from tax and 35% in non-tax revenue), 
whereas remaining 49% came from federal tax transfers that consisted of federal shared taxes 
(38%) and federal grants and development receipts (11%). In 1989, revenue composition 
showed that only 9% of total revenues were generated from taxes and 28% from non-tax 
heads, whereas share of federal transfers increased to 41%. By 1999, provincial reliance on  
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Figure 2.4: Composition of Provincial Revenue 
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federal resources substantial increased and share of federal transfers touches to 68% of total 
revenue. This may imply that over-dependence of provincial resources on federal grants and 
shared taxes destroyed the fiscal autonomy of provinces. In 2001, the government adopted 
devolution policies that give some fiscal autonomy to provinces. Resultantly, the composition 
of provincial revenue slightly improved. In 2009, provinces have generated 34% (1999: 30%) 
of revenue from their own resources (08% from tax and 26% from non-tax revenue).  
   Total consolidated expenditures (i.e. federal and provinces) are divided into 
current and development expenditures. The current expenditures include expenditures on 
defense, interest payments, general administration etc while development expenditures 
included expenditures on provision and expansion of basic infrastructure such as roads, 
bridges, dams etc., improving health and education facilities and investment in human capital.   
   Table 2.8 shows that development expenditures are far less than current 
expenditures which undermine the economic development. In 1978, in terms of GDP the 
development expenditure was 9.9% which is considered as highest figure during the period 
under review. However during 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, it showed a declining trend and 
touches as low as 2.2% of GDP in 2003. Thereafter, it showed an increasing trend and 
reached to 3.9% of GDP in 2009.     
Table 2.8: Composition of Consolidated Expenditure (As a % age of GDP) 
Expenditure Heads 1972 1978 1981 1991 1999 2003 2009 
Development 
Expenditure 4.9 9.9 9.3 6.4 3.4 2.2 3.9 
Current Expenditure 10.4 10.8 13.6 19.2 18.6 16.4 14.3 
Defence Expenditure 6.8 5.5 5 6.3 4.9 3.3 2.3 
Interest Payment 1.8 1.7 2.1 4.9 7.5 4.9 4.3 
Current Subsidies 0.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.5 1.2 2.3 
General 
Administration 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.3 2.1 2.8 
Others 0.5 2.1 4.4 5.4 4.1 5.0 2.7 
Source: Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey, various issues, Islamabad 
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   Defense and interest payments together, in absolute values, constituted more 
or less half of total expenditure. It means that about 50% of resources were for country’s 
protection from any aggressor and to finance fiscal deficit. General administrations form 
another significant head of spending (see Table 2.7). Under this head, the spending fluctuated 
within the range of 1.1% to 3.5% of GDP during the period under review.  
   The literature measures FD in its relative size. Figure 2.5 plots these relative 
shares where FD-Exp is a measure of FD in terms of expenditure which is defined as ratio of 
consolidated provincial expenditure in total expenditure net of intergovernmental transfers 
where total expenditure is sum of federal and consolidated provincial expenditures. Similarly, 
FD-Rev is a revenue approach measure and defined as ratio of consolidated provincial 
revenue to total revenue, net of inter-governmental transfers.    
Figure 2.5: Relative Fiscal Status of Provincial Governments (in %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on SBP Annual Reports various issues 
 
   The share of provincial spending in total spending initially declined from 14.9% 
in 1979 to 11.9% in 1981. General Zia, in 1980, promulgated the Local Government 
Ordinance which delegated some fiscal power of federal government to provincial 
government. Because of change in policy, the relative share of provinces increased from 11.9% 
to 19.6% in 1987. In 1988, political government took charge and reversed the policy of 
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General Zia. As a result, the relative share of provinces substantially decreased and touches 
the lowest share of 5.7% in 1997. General Musharaf again started devolution exercise in 2000 
and promulgated the Local Government Ordinance, 2001. By the promulgation of the 
Ordinance, as explained above certain functions which were earlier performed by the 
provinces such as primary and secondary education, water supply, drainage and sewerage etc.  
have been transferred to local government. The series of FD-Rev showed almost the same 
pattern as FD-Exp.  
2.4  Extent of Fiscal Decentralization: 
   As explained, the Devolution Plan of 2001 delegates administrative and 
expenditure responsibilities to local level. This changes the level of administrative decisions 
making authority and made them more accountable to their constituents. Table 2.9 shows 
extent of FD. 
Table 2.9: Expenditure by Different Levels of Government 
(Rs. Billion) 
 2000-01 Share (%) 2005-06 
Share 
(%) 2008-09 
Share 
(%) 
Federal 563.2 71.9 1006.7 63.8 2101.4 64.9 
Provincial 180.0 23.0 371.7 23.6 897.5 27.7 
Local 40.0 5.1 198.9 12.6 240.9 7.4 
Total 783.2 100.0 1577.3 100.0 3239.8 100.0 
As % of GDP 
Federal 13.4  13.0  16.0  
Provincial 4.3  4.8  6.9  
Local 1.0  2.6  1.8  
Total 18.7  20.4  24.7  
Source: Federal and Provincial Budget Estimates 
   During last military regime most of fiscal powers have been transferred from 
federal to local governments that are evident from an increasing share of expenditure of local 
government. In 2001, share of local governments was 5.1%. By 2006, it increased to 12.6%. 
 
 
23 
 
However, subsequent democratic government 15  changes the policy and strengthens the 
provincial governments’ fiscal autonomy by reversing fiscal powers that were earlier 
delegated to local governments. As a result, provincial governments’ share increases from 
23.6% to 27.7%. Although, share of local governments has reduced from 12.6% to 7.4% by 
2009, the present share is even higher than the share they had in 2001.  From Table 2.9 we 
may conclude that military regimes used decentralization as a strategy for strengthen their 
governments.   
  
                                                          
15 General Musharaf resigned from Presidency on November, 2007 and democratic government took the charge 
after election on February, 2008. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review: Linking Fiscal Decentralization 
to Economic Growth∗ 
       
  Analyzing theoretical links between FD and economic growth is important as 
it provides a base to researchers and policy analysts for validating these theoretical links 
empirically. Theory suggests that interdependence between FD and economic growth is 
multi-directional. Thus, literature emphasizes that while doing empirical analysis these links 
should be examined in that way. Although empirical and theoretical analysis have been 
improved and extended over the years but still a formalized theory is to be developed 
[Thießen (2000)]. Following paragraphs briefly reviews possible links between FD and 
economic growth in multi-directions such as communities’ heterogeneous preferences, inter-
jurisdictional competition among local governments and economies of scales and external 
effects associated with decentralization policy.  
  People in a society have heterogeneous preferences. Though it is possible but 
knowing the preference of each household is costly and time consuming effort. It is relatively 
difficult to have complete knowledge of citizens’ taste. The “Preference Revelation Problem” 
may be headache for society. One possible solution is to divide society into smaller groups as 
in a small group demand of a randomly selected household will be closer to average 
household’s demand. Economic welfare of the society will improve as the services provided 
to each group will be in accordance with their preferences and tastes. Thus, FD can raise the 
Pareto efficiency [Theiβen (2000) hypothesis].  
   Although public goods can efficiently be provided through central government 
but this provision is generally far from community preferences. Higher transaction, 
                                                          
∗ The idea for discussion on theoretical part is mainly derived from Markus (2004) 
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information and frustration costs are the consequences. These costs can be minimized by 
decentralizing provision of public services. If decentralization attempts are able to satisfy 
consumers’ demand that enhances the consumer efficiency, positive economic growth may be 
the result. The Figure 3.1 illustrates potential link between FD and economic growth. 
Figure 3.1: Decentralization Theorem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decentralized system may promote political and organizational innovations 
and may enforce competition among various authorities. Efficiency gains can be realized by 
utilizing comparative advantages and by divisions of labor that promotes economic growth.  
The productivity enhancement hypothesis can be demonstrated with the help of Figure 3.2. It 
may be noted that FD not only enforces inter-jurisdictional competition but also makes local 
governments accountable to their constituents; which gives incentive to government to 
innovate products. Producer efficiency in the supply of public goods increases which in turn 
enhances the economic growth.   
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Figure 3.2: Productivity Enhancement Hypothesis 
 
    On the other hand, inter-jurisdictional competition may lead to tax 
competitions that encourage mobility; sub-optimal allocation of resources may be results. 
Further, it may also encourage regional disparity through mobility of resources that may 
reduce the provision of public goods and services. The negative economic growth may be 
consequences (see Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3: Inter-Jurisdictional Tax Competition 
 
 
   The arguments that support the assignment of functional responsibilities to 
central governments are economies of scale and external effects. The economies of scale 
mean average cost decreases as output level increases. Generally central government is in a 
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better position to enjoy the economies of scale by producing output at bulk quantities as it 
may have more access to resources as compared to local government. However, provision of 
additional public goods or services may change the average cost function. In case of 
decreasing cost function, it is not cleared whether the provision of public goods and services 
through central production are feasible or not, if information, frustration and transaction costs 
occurred at central level are taken into account. It implies that argument for centralization 
should be examined after consideration of all interregional spillover effects.  
  Natural monopolies 16  and inter-jurisdictional externalities 17  are generally 
regulated and dealt by central governments whereas local governments generally manage the 
activities18 that have limited regional impact [Hemming and Spahn (1997)]. Co-operation and 
collaboration among local governments, fiscal transfers or grand-in-aid may be significant 
means for internalizing the effects of these externalities. However, this may affect 
macroeconomic stability. A higher degree of FD together with presence of external effects, 
ceteris paribus, may reduce the economic growth as supply of public goods and services may 
be inefficient (see Figure 3.4). 
   Figure 3.4: Macroeconomic Stability and Economic Growth 
 
    
                                                          
16 like Railways, Telecommunications etc. 
17 like pollution abatements   
18 such as sewerage, water supply, in-city-transportation etc. 
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   Keeping the above theoretical arguments, it may be concluded that it is very 
difficult a prior to say whether FD affect economic growth positively or negatively. 
   Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) are considered as pioneer 
in examining theoretical role of FD in economic growth while empirical work started by 
Oates (1995). Probably the main reason for not finding many empirical studies before 1995 is 
the lack of data at the local government level.  Since then, a number of studies attempted to 
quantify the impact by relating some measure of FD to economic growth.  
  Researchers and policy analysts have tried different approaches for linking FD 
to economic growth. For example, in a sample of seventeen studies, nine studies have used 
cross-country data for this purpose. Oates (1995) used 40 countries panel data; Davoodi and 
Zou (1998) investigated 46 developing and OECD countries; Woller and Phillips (1998) 
analyzed 23 LDCs; Yilmaz (1999) examined 30 cross-countries by dividing them into federal 
(13) and unitary (17) countries; De Mello (2000) analyzed 17 OECD and 13 Non-OECD 
countries; Thieβen (2000 and 2003) studied all high-income OECD countries; Rodríguez-
Pose and Krøijer (2008) studied 16 Central and Eastern Europe countries and Baskaran and 
Feld (2009) analyzed 23 OECD countries panel data.  Country specific analysis has also been 
made by some researchers. For instance, Zhang and Zou (1998) and Lin and Liu (2000) made 
the analysis for China; Xie et. al (1999) and Hammond and Tosun (2009) for United States; 
Behnisch et. al (2001) for Germany; Zhang and Zou (2001) for China and India (in a same 
paper); Desi et. al (2003) for Russia; and Malik et. al (2006) for Pakistan. 
  While determining the empirical relationship, probably the most important 
methodological problem is finding of an accurate measure for prevailing degree of FD. This 
issue has been resolved in the literature by defining the term ‘fiscal decentralization’ in 
 
 
29 
 
various ways. Most researchers defined this term as share of sub-national government 
expenditure (or revenue) in total government expenditure (or revenue), net of inter-
governmental transfers [see Oates (1995), Davoodi and Zou (1998), Woller and Phillips 
(1998), Xie et. al (1999), Yilmaz (1999), Thieβen (2000 and 2003) and Malik et. al (2006) for 
details]. There are some studies which purify the term further either by subtracting defence 
and social securities/interest payments from consolidated expenditure as these are exclusively 
under the domain of federal/central government [see Woller and Phillips (1998) and Malik et. 
al (2006) for details] or by analyzing various spending categories at the central level such as 
education and science as one category and transport and communication other [see Behnisch 
et. al (2001) for detail]. However, Zhang and Zou (1998 and 2001) defined this term as a ratio 
of consolidated provincial budgetary spending to central budgetary spending.  
   The other proxies for FD that have been used in the empirical research are 
share of central government expenditures in total public expenditures [Behnisch et. al (2001)]; 
tax revenue retention and marginal retention rate of government revenue of sub-national 
governments [Desai et. al (2003) and Lin and Liu (2000) respectively]; and self-reliance ratio 
defined as own revenues of sub-national governments as a share of their total revenue [Oates 
(1995) and Thieβen (2000 and 2003)]. 
   It is worth mentioning that although researchers and policy analysts have paid 
many efforts for determining impact of FD on economic growth but direction of this impact is 
still unclear as for some countries it is positive for others it is negative. In a sample of 
seventeen studies, nine have found positive impact; three have negative while others either 
has mixed or inconclusive results. Interestingly, one study has concluded that FD is unrelated 
with economic growth19. The details of findings of sample studies are as follows.  
                                                          
19 i.e. Baskaran and Feld (2009) 
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   Oates (1995) found a significant and robust positive association between FD 
and per capita economic growth. Thieβen (2000) found some empirical evidence that suggest 
positive relation of capital formation to increasing self-reliance. For high-income countries, 
he suggested a hump-shaped relation between per capita economic growth and FD.  Whereas 
in his 2003 study, he found convergence among high-income OECD countries towards a 
medium degree of FD that tend to promote economic growth. Lin and Liu (2000) argued that 
overall economic growth of China positively depends on FD as it improves resource 
allocation efficiency rather than brings more investment opportunities. Desi, et. al (2003) 
found a positive effect of tax retention on growing output of 80 Russian regions. Behnisch et. 
al (2001) examined long-term German’s experience of productivity growth and public sector 
centralization. By defining their theoretical model, they showed that federal government 
activities may have substantial effects on productivity growth because of spillover effects of 
provision of public services through sub-national governments. They analyzed various 
categories of central spending like education and science, transport and communication etc 
and found a consistent overall development with a motivating role of federal government. 
However, when they empirically analyzed post World War II period, they have some doubts 
in the efficiency of public sector with respect to productivity growth. 
   Davoodi and Zou (1998) studied a panel of developed and developing 
countries and found insignificant negative correlation between FD and economic growth for 
developing countries. However for developed countries, they failed to find any systematic 
relationship. They noted that this relationship seems to be more significant when they used 
whole sample.  Zhang and Zou (1998) found negative but significant impact of FD on 
provincial economic growth of China. They interpreted their negative result as “current stage 
of economic development in China, where the central government is constantly constrained 
by the limited resources for public investment in national priorities such as highways, 
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railways, power stations, telecommunications, and energy. Such key infrastructure projects 
may have a far more significant impact on growth across provinces than their counterparts in 
each province.”20 Rodríguez-Pose and Krøijer (2008) studied 16 Eastern and Central Europe 
countries and used different economic indicators in their analysis. Two out of three indicators 
showed negative relationship. When they used different time lags in their analysis it nuance 
the negative impact and shows that variation in long term effects depend on the type of 
decentralization system adopted by given country. 
   Yilmaz (1999) analyzed 30 cross-countries data and divide them into federal 
and unitary countries. For latter countries he found positive impact of FD on per capita 
growth while for former countries he has inconclusive result. Xie et. al (1999) by examining 
United States (US) economy estimated positive impact for state spending and negative impact 
for local spending. However, their coefficients are insignificant. They concluded that 
“existing spending shares for state and local governments are consistent with the growth 
maximization. In this sense further decentralization in public spending may be harmful for 
growth.”21  Hammond and Tosun (2009) analyzed the impact for US county population, 
employment and real income growth. Their results differ for non-metropolitan and 
metropolitan counties. They suggested that for local economic growth, type of government 
organization matters but the varying impacts depend on use of economic indicator and type of 
government unit.  
   Zhang and Zou (2001) computed the impact of FD on economic growth for 
China and India in same paper. For India, they found a positive but mostly insignificant 
relationship between the per capita FD-shares and state economic growth. For China, they 
found negative but statistically significant association between FD and provincial economic 
                                                          
20 Zhang and Zou (1998), p. 237. 
21 Xie et. al (1999), p. 228. 
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growth. In their study, they concluded that “the state allocation of public spending in various 
sectors is broadly consistent with ‘growth maximizing’ whereas increases in the central 
allocation of its budget among development projects, non-development projects, and social 
and community services by cutting the center’s spending on all other functions can promote 
regional growth.”22  Vazquez and McNab (2001) deeply reviewed current knowledge in the 
economic literature of casual relationship between FD and economic growth. They concluded 
that current theoretical knowledge of how decentralization effect economic growth is too 
limited and empirical finding is also mixed. They examined direct and indirect effects of 
decentralization that has potential impact on economic growth. They reported that direct 
effect of decentralization leads to higher economic growth while there are some other forces 
such as corruption, capture by elite group, regional inequalities and macroeconomic 
instability (if decentralization is not properly implemented) lower the economic growth.   
   Woller and Phillips (1998) did not find any systematic and strong relationship 
between FD and LDC’s economic growth. They observed weak negative relationship 
between FD and economic growth when they used five years average. De Mello (2000) while 
studying impact of FD on budget balance argued that especially in developing countries, 
coordination failures in decentralized policy-making and in intergovernmental fiscal relations 
lead to deficit bias. Baskaran and Feld (2009) analyzed 23 OECD countries and found that 
robustness of the result mainly depend on how the model is specified. Their initial findings 
suggest that FD causes lower growth rate. They conclude that FD is unrelated with economic 
growth.   
   For Pakistan, a very few studies have been made so far on FD. Chema et. al 
(2004) analyzed the recent decentralization reforms in a historical context. Their study 
pointed out that “each of the reform experiments is a complementary change to a wider 
                                                          
22 Zhang and Zou (2001), p. 58. 
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constitutional reengineering strategy devised to further centralization of political power in 
the hands of the non-representative centre.”23  Zaidi (2005) examined decentralization and 
devolution debate in a political economy framework and context. Pasha and Pasha (2000) in 
their study identified major issues associated with devolution plan announced recently by 
Pakistan. This study recommended that fiscal transfers, to the extent possible, should be 
general, unconditional and formula-driven. Further, it should give an opportunity to newly 
formed local governments for proving their ability in the provision of cost effective local 
goods and services in accordance with local needs and preferences. Malik et. al (2006) 
examines empirical relationship between FD and economic growth. They found positive 
association between them and argued that at the early stage of development in Pakistan, 
federal government is in a better position to tackle the fiscal responsibilities as it has limited 
resources and has to invest in key infrastructure projects like telecommunications, railways, 
highways etc. in accordance with national priorities that may have a far more significant 
impact on growth. They further conclude that if the shares of provincial government revenues 
and expenditures rise continuously then it can slow the pace of economic growth.  
  
                                                          
23 Chema et. al (2004), p. 01. 
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Chapter 4  
Empirical Analysis 
 
  As discussed in chapter 3 a formalized theory for evaluating direct impact of 
FD on economic growth is to be developed and its absence weekend the soundness of the 
empirical work on this subject [Vezquez and McNab (2001)]. However, the empirical 
investigations on direct impact of FD will provide various aspects of insights relationships.  
   In the literature, three types of traditional growth regressions have been used: 
panel data regressions based on several period averages; pure cross-country regressions; and 
country specific regression. These analyses generally used OLS techniques and found static 
relationship. Present study is based on country specific regression methodology and 
investigates dynamic relationship between the two variables of interest. 
4.1 Theoretical Model:  
   There are generally two ways to measure the degree of FD: expenditure 
approach and revenue approach. In first approach, the degree of FD has conventionally been 
measured as a share of sub-national government expenditures in total government 
expenditures net of intergovernmental transfers24 . In revenue approach, FD is the ratio of 
sub-national government revenues to total government revenues25. Following Davoodi and 
Zou (1998); Zhong and Zou (1998); and Xie et. al (1999), this study uses expenditure 
approach as a measure of FD. Under this approach, FD has been defined as share of 
consolidated provincial expenditure to total expenditure. Where consolidated expenditure is 
sum of all four provinces expenditures, net of inter-governmental transfers and total 
expenditure is sum of consolidated expenditure and federal expenditure.  A ceteris paribus 
                                                          
24 see Oates (1995); Davoodi and Zou (1998); Zhong and Zou (1998); Xie, et. al (1999) etc. for details. 
25 see Woller and Phillips (1998) etc. for details 
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condition may exist in the following form: higher the share of consolidated provincial 
governments’ expenditure relative to total expenditure, higher the degree of FD. 
   Following Barro (1990) and Zhang and Zou (2001) an endogenous growth 
model consisting of a production function with several inputs is assumed: labour, physical 
capital, human capital, openness of economy and FD.   
Output = f (Labour, Capital, Education, Openness, Fiscal Decentralization, ……..) 
                       (+)   (+)      (+)              (+)       (+/-) 
 
   Using Cobb-Douglas production function the above function in term of 
explicit form can be written as: 
(Y)t = At (FD)t ψ1 (POP)t ψ2 (GFC)t ψ3 (MIDDLE)t ψ4 (OPEN)t ψ5         ……. (4.1) 
   Where Y is real Gross Domestic Product at time ‘t’; A is the total factor 
productivity at time ‘t’; and FD is a measure of fiscal decentralization as defined above. The 
remaining variables are defined in the following paragraphs. For estimation purpose, equation 
(4.1) can be specified as follows: 
ln(Y)t = ψ0 + ψ1ln(FD)t + ψ2ln(POP)t + ψ3ln(GFC)t + ψ4ln(MIDDLE)t +  
ψ5ln(OPEN)t +  εt                       ………….. (4.2) 
 Where: 
  POP  =  Population at time ‘t’ (a proxy is used for labour); 
GFC  =  Gross Fixed Capital Formulation at time ‘t’  
(a proxy is used for capital); 
MIDDLE  =  Gross Enrollment in School at Middle level at time ‘t’ 
(a proxy is used for human capital); 
OPEN  =  Openness (a measure of trade liberalization) at time ‘t’; 
      ψi   =  Coefficients are to be estimated; and 
   εt  =  Error term assumed to be white noise. 
   Labour and capital are one of the essential drivers for economic growth. They 
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play a vital role in boosting economic activity. Proper amount of these two inputs make 
economy vibrant and stable.  Investment in capital goods such as machinery and equipments, 
and technology not only enhances the efficiency and output of the economy but also increases 
employment opportunity, capacity and productivity of inputs that leads to economic growth. 
Population (POP) and Gross Fixed Capital Formulation (GFC) are used respectively as a 
proxy for labour and capital inputs.  
   Human capital is also very important determinant of economic growth. It 
determines potential for future growth. Higher investment in human capital leads to larger 
economic growth. Investment in education is one of the indicators of human capital. 
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Woller and Phillips (1998), gross enrolment in 
school at middle level (MIDDLE) is used as a proxy for human capital. 
   Theoretical and empirical research suggests that trade liberalization has a 
strong and positive correlation with economic growth over longer period of time. Jin (2000) 
argued that trade liberalization or openness is used to be an important and critical factor for 
economic activity. Whereas, Sachs and Warner (1995) are of the view that “open economies 
has grown about 2.5% faster than closed economies and the difference is even larger among 
developing countries.”26 Thus, a rise in openness (OPEN) is expected to have a positive 
impact on economic growth. 
4.2  Empirical Model: 
    Depending upon the order of integration, the present study adopts a recently 
new framework called Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) framework developed 
by Pesaran and Shin (1999); Pesaran et. al (2001) for determination of long-run relationship 
between two variables of interest. This approach has advantages over the previous 
conventional techniques of Johensan (1998). The conventional technique requires that all the 
                                                          
26 cited in Mohammad (2010), p. 422. 
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system’s variables are integrated of order 1. Whilst, this new technique is applicable for 
testing the co-integration at levels irrespective whether the  underlying regressors are purely 
I(0) or I(1) or mixture of both. It is worth mentioning that in case of having I(2) variables in 
the model, the ARDL technique crashes and it yields spurious results.  According to Ouattara 
(2004), if variables are I(2), the computed F-statistics are not valid and the estimated results 
are spurious because the bound testing approach is based on the assumption that the variables 
are either I(0) or I(1) not I(2). Finally, this new technique could be used with limited number 
of observations (30 observations to 80 observations).  
   With respect to Equation (4.2) it is assumed that there is a long-run 
relationship among GDP, FD, POP, GFC, MIDDLE, and OPEN. As the direction of long-run 
relationship among the variables is unknown, a prior, the following unrestricted error 
correction model can be regressed for determination of long-run relationship: 
∆ln(Y)t = α + ∑
=
n
i 1
 βi ∆ln(Y)t-I +
 
∑
=
n
i 0
 γi ∆ln(FD)t-i    + ∑
=
n
i 0
δi ∆ln(POP)t-i +   
∑
=
n
i 0
θi ∆ln(GFC)t-i  + ∑
=
n
i 0
λi ∆ln(MIDDLE)t-i + ∑
=
n
i 0
πi ∆ln(OPEN)t-i +  ψ1 ln(Y)t-1  +  
ψ2 ln(FD)t-1 + ψ3 ln(POP)t-1 + ψ4 ln(GFC)t-1 + ψ5 ln(MIDDLE)t-1 +  
ψ6 ln(OPEN)t-1 + νt    ……….….(4.3) 
   Where ‘∆’ is first difference operator, ‘i’ is the number of lags, ‘n’ is the 
optimal lags length which can be chosen either Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) or Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) before the given model is estimated by OLS and νt  is the error 
term. However, given the limited number of observations (38) and use of annual data, 
following Pesaran and Shin (1999), the lag length is restricted to two (i.e. n=2).  
   The F-test is used for validating of long-run relationship. The null hypothesis 
for no long-run relationship amongst the variables in equation (4.3) is  
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(H0: ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3 = ψ4 = ψ5 = ψ6 = 0) against the alternative hypothesis (H1: ψ1 ≠ ψ2 ≠ ψ3 ≠ ψ4 ≠ 
ψ5 ≠ ψ6 ≠ 0). Two critical values [I(0) and I(1)] are taking from Pesaran (2001). The value I(0) 
shows the lower bound while I(1) represent the upper bound. If computed F-statistics is 
greater than upper bound, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship can be rejected. 
Conversely, if computed value of F-statistics is lower than lower bound, the null hypothesis 
can not be rejected. Finally, if computed F-statistics falls between lower and upper bounds, 
the results are inconclusive. 
   Once the long-run relationship is established using equation (4.3) and 
following the above procedure, the long-run model can be estimated as follows:  
ln(Y)t = Ω0 + ∑
=
n
i 1
Ω1ln(Y)t-i  + ∑
=
n
i 0
Ω2ln(FD)t-i + ∑
=
n
i 0
Ω3ln(POP)t-i + ∑
=
n
i 0
Ω4 ln(GFC)t-i  + ∑
=
n
i 0
 
Ω5 ln(MIDDLE)t-i + ∑
=
n
i 0
 Ω6 ln(OPEN)t-i + νt                …………….(4.4) 
   Where, all variables are as previously defined and ‘i’ represents the optimal 
number of lags which can be selected by using either AIC or SBC criteria. After estimating 
the long-rum model, the short-run dynamic parameters can be obtained by estimating the 
following error-correction model associated with long-run elasticities: 
∆ln(Y)t = ρ0 + ∑
=
n
i 1
Πi∆ln(Y)t-i  + ∑
=
n
i 0
Θi∆ln(FD)t-i  + ∑
=
n
i 0
Ωi∆ln(POP)t-i +  
∑
=
n
i 0
Ψi∆ln(GFC)t-i  + ∑
=
n
i 0
Γi∆ln(MIDDLE)t-i + ∑
=
n
i 0
Фi∆ln(OPEN)t-i +  
λECTt-1 + νt    ………..….(4.5) 
   Where Πi, Θi, Ωi, Ψi, Γi, and Фi, are coefficients of short-run dynamic 
parameters and λ captures the speed of adjustment and tells us how much of the adjustment to 
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equilibrium takes place each period, or how much of the equilibrium error is corrected. 
  Annual data for the period of 1972-2009 is used for empirical analysis. Data 
on GDP at market price is taken from Pakistan Economic Survey various issue. For making 
the data real, it is divided by Consumer Price Index and data is taken from the same source. 
The real GDP is used as a proxy for economic growth mainly for the reasons that it is easy to 
measure and interpret than other economic performance indicators and data on this variable is 
readily available. 
   Data on FD, POP, GFC and MIDDLE are obtained from Handbook of 
Statistics on Pakistan Economy 2005 up to year 2005 while the data on remaining years are 
obtained from ‘Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10’.  Openness is defined as total volume of 
foreign trade (sum of export and import) as a percentage of GDP and data is taken from 
Penn’s World Table.  
4.3 Empirical Results: 
 
   Prior to testing the long-run relationship between variables of interest, a unit 
root test is conducted for each variable for checking the order of integration. Even though 
ARDL does not require pre-testing of variable, the unit root test is conducted to convince my-
self whether or not ARDL technique can be used. As discussed above, in presence of I(2) 
variables, ARDL technique crashes and its yields spurious results. For checking the order of 
integration, Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is conducted.  Results of ADF are presented 
in Table 4.1. It is clear from the Table 4.1 that FD, POP and OPEN are stationary at level 
while Y, GFC and MIDDLE are stationary at first difference operator. This implies that 
ARDL technique can be used as it confirms the complex nature of dynamic properties of 
variables, with mixture of I(0) and I(1) series that are suitable for  using ARDL technique.  
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Table 4.1 : Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for Unit Root  
 
Variables 
ADF Test Statistics  
Criteria ConclusionLevel First  Difference 
ln (Y) -1.470 -6.055* With intercept I(1) 
ln (FD) -4.515* - With intercept and trend I(0) 
ln (POP) -3.190** - With intercept I(0) 
ln (GFC) -1.578 -5.183* With intercept I(1) 
ln (MIDDLE) -0.941 -5.831* With intercept I(1) 
ln (OPEN) -7.774* - With intercept and trend I(0) 
*, **, *** represent the significance at 1%, 5% & 10% respectively 
Source: Author’s calculation based on E-views 
 
   In ARDL analysis, the first step is to determine the existence of long-run 
relationship among the variables. For this purposes, equation (4.3) is estimated. Following 
Pesaran and Shin (1999) maximum two orders of lag are used in the estimation. F-statistics is 
computed by applying Wald test wherein coefficients of long-run variables are restricted (i.e. 
ψ1 =  ψ2 = ψ3 = ψ4 = ψ5 =  ψ6 = 0). The computed F-statistics together with critical values 
computed by Pesaran et.al (2001) are shown in Table 4.2. The computed F-statistics (3.776) is 
higher than upper bound critical value at 10 % significance level (3.56), using unrestricted 
intercept and unrestricted trend27. This implies that the null hypothesis of non existence of 
long-run relationship can be rejected. Thus, it establishes that there is a long run relationship 
among the variables. 
Table 4.2: Testing For the Existence of Long-Run Relationship 
Computed  
F-statistics Value Level of Significance
Critical Values  
(unrestricted intercept and 
unrestricted trend) 
I(0) I(1) 
3.776 
1% 
5% 
10% 
3.60 
2.87 
2.53 
4.90 
4.00 
3.59 
Source: critical values are obtained from Pesaran et.al (2001) 
   After establishing the long run relationship, coefficients of long-run model 
(equation 4.4) are estimated. The optimal lags are selected on the basis of AIC criteria. The 
                                                          
27 The other possibilities as proposed by Pesaran et. al (2001) such as unrestricted intercept and restricted trend 
etc. were also checked but the result was not significant. 
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estimated results are reported in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3: Long-Run Model 
[Dependent Variable: ln (Y)] 
 
ARDL (1,0,0,1,2,1) is selected on the basis of AIC criteria 
Variables28 Coefficients Std. Error t-Statistics p-value 
ln (Y)t-1 0.494* 0.144 3.421 0.002 
ln (FD) t 0.077*** 0.041 1.873 0.072 
ln (POP) t 0.871** 0.356 2.445 0.021 
ln (GFC) t-1 0.103* 0.025 4.058 0.000 
ln (MIDDLE)t-2 -0.129* 0.039 -3.287 0.003 
ln (OPEN) t-1 -0.101** 0.049 -2.073 0.048 
Constant 1.989** 0.578 3.440 0.002 
Trend 0.011** 0.004 2.712 0.011 
     
R-squared 0.999  S.E. Reg. 0.022 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998  No. of Obs. 36 
* , **, *** represent 1%, 5% and 10%  level of significance respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on E-Views 5 
  The estimated coefficients of long-run relationship show that FD has positive 
and significant impact on output. It is significant at 10%. The result is inline with our 
expectation and findings of Lin and Liu (2000), Behnisch et. al (2001) and Malik et. al (2006). 
The magnitude of its coefficient shows that ceteris paribus, if 1% autonomy in expenditure is 
given to the provinces, it will raise the output by more than 0.07%. The statistical 
significance of this variable supported the theoretical linkages of FD with economic growth 
as discussed in chapter 3. The positive relation implies that society has started getting benefit 
from decentralization policy. The sign of population is positive and significant at 
conventional 5% level of significance.  The results suggest that ceteris paribus, a 1% increase 
in population size leads to more than 0.87% rise in output level. Gross fixed capital 
formulation is significant at 1% and has positive impact on economic growth. The human 
capital that is proxied by gross enrollment in school at middle level has significant but 
negative impact on economic growth. The apparently negative impact of human capital on 
                                                          
28 Beside these variables, other variables such as Labor Force, Market Capitalization, External Debt, Inflation 
Rate, Fiscal Deficit etc which have possible effect on economic growth were also included in the model but the 
results were not significant.  
 
 
42 
 
output may be due to measurement inaccuracies. The possible implication for this negative 
sign might be that knowledge imparted during the school is not enough for making labor 
force productive. The openness is statistically significant at 5% but appears with negative 
sign. This implies that Pakistan’s economy is specializing in sectors which have 
comparatively disadvantage in the long-run. Alternatively speaking, the economy is 
specializing in traditional goods and experience is reduction in long-run economic growth.  
   The results of short-run dynamics associated with long-run elasticities 
estimated from equation 4.5 are reported at Table 4.4.  The sign of short-run dynamic impacts 
are maintained to the long-run except openness variable whose sign has now changed to 
positive. However, when short-run model is estimated on the basis of long-run relationship, 
all control variables become insignificant at conventional levels of significance. This is inline 
with modern growth theories which argued that under steady state of growth, in short-run, 
differenced variables become insignificant.  
   The coefficient of Error Correction term (ECTt-1) measures the speed of 
adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. It is significant at 10% and has correct sign which 
ensures that long-run equilibrium can be attained. The magnitude of its coefficient shows that 
approximately 56% of disequilibria from the previous year’s shock converge back to the 
long-run equilibrium in the current year. 
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Table 4.4: Short Run Dynamics – Error Correction Model 
[Dependent Variable: ∆ln(Y)] 
 
ARDL (1,0,0,1,2,1) is selected on the basis of AIC criteria  
Variables Coefficients Std. Error t-Statistics p-Value
∆ ln(Y)t-1 0.217 0.289 0.753 0.459
∆ ln(FD)t 0.124 0.040 3.098 0.005
∆ ln (POP)t 0.106 0.136 0.776 0.445
∆ ln (GFC)t-1 0.095 0.061 1.556 0.132
∆ ln (MIDDLE)t-2 -0.053 0.042 -1.253 0.222
∆ ln (OPEN)t-1 0.014 0.057 0.252 0.803
Constant 0.054 0.018 2.955 0.007
Trend -0.001 0.000 -2.062 0.050
ECTt-1 -0.560 0.323 -1.737 0.095
  
R-squared 0.368 S.E. Reg. 0.026
Adjusted R-squared 0.166 No. of Obs. 34
*, **, *** represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on E-Views 5 
   The ARDL model is well fitted in term of adjusted R-squared. Value of 
Adjusted R-square implies that about 99% of the variation in the GDP is explained by 
independent variables. The model passes the diagnostic tests for serial correlation, functional 
form misspecification, and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) test. The 
model also passes Jarque-Bera normality test which implies that errors are normally 
distributed. The cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) 
of recursive residual test are also conducted for checking the structural stability. The model 
looks stable and correctly specified as both CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test statistics are within 
the bounds of 5% level of significance (see Figure 4.1 and 4.2 respectively). 
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Cumulative Sum of Square of Recursive Residual 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
   The present study relates FD with economic growth in theoretical as well as in 
empirical manner. The present study also analyzed efforts of political and military 
governments for accelerating the process of decentralization in Pakistan.  
   While analyzing the trends of public finance, it is observed that Pakistan’s 
public finance has following characteristics: poor revenue mobilization, persistent fiscal 
deficit, high vertical imbalances between federal and provinces, highly skewed expenditure 
structure and weak financial management. Present study also discussed the system of inter-
governmental fiscal relation as specified in the Constitution (1973). The striking feature is 
that the existence of local government is not formally part of Constitution (1973) till 17th 
amendments made in 2003. However, by amendments, the existence of local government is 
partially protected. 
   The theoretical linkages between FD and economic growth have been 
reviewed.  The analysis of theoretical linkages showed that FD influences economic growth 
through improved supply of public goods by considering diverse local preferences and inter-
jurisdictional competition among sub-national governments which provides incentives for 
product innovation that enhance consumers as well as producers efficiency. However, theory 
also suggests that FD leads to macroeconomic instability, vertical imbalances, and inter-
jurisdictional tax competition that lead to higher regional disparities or more corruption. 
Therefore, it is very difficult a prior to conclude whether FD affect economic growth 
positively or negatively. 
   This study used a newly developed technique of ARDL for determination of 
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long-run relationship between FD and economic growth.  Following the literature, 
expenditure approach is used for measuring the degree of FD. Under this approach FD is 
defined as share of consolidated provincial government expenditures in total government 
expenditures net of intergovernmental transfers and real GDP is used as a proxy for economic 
growth. After controlling the effect of growth by including other variables into the model, the 
ARDL technique is used for checking the long-run relationship. It established the long-run 
relationship amongst the variables of interest. The findings of the study imply that over 
dependence of provincial governments on centre, undefined functional and tax 
responsibilities, limited and unaffected tax base for provincial and local governments 
undermines the full benefits of FD. 
  The present study also offers several policy implications. First of all, under the 
condition that explicit aim of policy makers to induce economic performance by enhancing 
efficiency and accountability in public resources, the results of present study suggest that FD 
can be used as a tool for accomplishment of this aim. Second, having its long-run association 
with economic growth, it provides an alternative policy option for achieving the aim of 
sustainable long-run economic growth.  Third, the benefits of decentralization could be 
higher if the policy makers pay attention for improving the prevailing socio-economic 
conditions, institutional mechanism and legal system. Fourth, the study suggests that Pakistan 
should specialize in a sector where it has comparative advantage and move from trade of 
traditional sectors to value-added manufacturing sectors. Finally, the study suggests that 
policy makers should pay attention for accumulation of human capital as it has long-run 
relationship with economic growth. 
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ANNEX - I 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSIGNING FUNCTIONS IN A 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 
   
   The literature on fiscal federalism provides some fundamental principles for 
assigning functional responsibilities to various levels of government in a federal system. 
These include: 
 Efficiency: The assignment of functions should ensure that the economy is 
operating with economic efficiency, i.e. ensuring that all gains from trade are fully exploited 
given the resources, technology and constraints facing society. 
 Cost Effectiveness: Functions need to be assigned to the level of government which 
can perform them with least cost (economic and social) to the society. For example, local 
services should be assigned to sub-national governments, not only because they can better 
cater to local preferences but also because they can provide these services at a lower cost as 
they are likely to have lower overheads. Moreover, proximity to the service location can 
reduce the cost of monitoring and evaluation. 
 Vertical Equity: A major issue of fiscal federalism is the level of government 
that should be responsible for vertical equity. An argument can be made for centralization of 
functions on the grounds that society’s social welfare function ought to include all persons in 
the federation, and how much to redistribute from more to less affluent segments should not 
depend on which locality these persons reside in. On the other hand, there may be distinctly 
local preferences for the extent of redistribution, and some localities may have a lower 
aversion to inequality than others. Decentralizing the redistributive functions of government 
could therefore allow for “local preferences” for intra-regional inequalities. 
 Internal Common Market: Efficiency requires that fiscal policies (i.e. regulation 
and tax, subsidy, procurement and public expenditure policies) should not impede the 
movement of goods, services, labor and capital within the federation. 
 
 Local Public Goods and Externalities: The federation should be decentralized 
enough to be able to provide the type, mix and quality of public services according to the 
 
 
53 
 
preferences of its residents. However, in practice the benefits (positive or negative) of local 
public expenditures may spill over to the residents of neighboring jurisdictions. Since local 
governments will have no incentive to take account of these spillover benefits, a careful 
balance is needed in the roles of each level of government. 
 Fiscal deficiency and equity:  While assigning functions and roles to various 
levels of government, inter-regional differences in fiscal capacity need to be kept in mind and 
also addressed explicitly. 
 Source: World Bank (2000) 
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ANNEX - II 
AREAS OF TAXATION AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
Federal Government: 
  The Constitution (1973) specifies the following as areas of taxing responsibility 
for the federal government: 
i) customs duties, including export duties; 
ii) excise duties, including duties on salt but excluding duties on alcoholic liquors, 
opium and other narcotics; 
iii) duties in respect to succession of property; 
iv) estate duty in respect to property; 
v) income taxes other than on agricultural income; 
vi) corporation tax; 
vii) taxes on sales and purchase of goods imported, exported, produced, manufactured 
or consumed; 
viii) taxes on the capital value of assets, not including taxes on capital gains on 
immovable consumed; 
ix) taxes on mineral oil, natural gas and mineral for use in generation of nuclear 
energy; 
x) taxes and duties on production capacity of any plant, machinery, undertaking, 
establishment or installation in lieu of any or more of them, and 
xi) terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air and taxes on 
their fares and freights. 
Provincial Government: 
 All other forms of taxes fall under the purview of the provincial governments. 
The provincial governments than allocate some of these to the local governments on the basis 
of the Local Government Ordinances (LGOs). Taxes retained by the provincial governments 
under the LGOs include: 
i) tax on agricultural income; 
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ii) capital gains tax on immovable property; 
iii) excise duties on alcoholic liquors, opium and other narcotics; 
iv) tax on professions, trades, calling or employment; 
v) tax on immovable property; 
vi) land revenue; 
vii) motor vehicle taxes; 
viii) stamp duties; 
ix) entertainment taxes, and 
x) taxes on purchase and sale of services (excluding railway, sea or air; transport). 
  Source: World Bank (2000) 
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ANNEX - III 
AREA OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION AUTHORITY ASSIGNED UNDER 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORDINANCES 
  
 The fiscal powers delegated to the local governments by the LGOs include the 
following taxation powers: 
i) octroi; 
ii) tax on annual rental value of buildings and land (except in Sindh) 
iii) tax on cinemas and cinema tickets; 
iv) entertainment tax on dramatic and theatrical shows; 
v) tax on the transfer of immovable property; 
vi) fees for licenses, sanctions  and permissions; 
vii) market fees; 
viii) rates on services like water supply, drainage, lighting etc; 
ix) fees at fairs, agricultural shows, etc; 
x) fees for specific services; 
xi) tax for export of goods and animals; 
xii) tolls on roads and bridges; 
xiii) tax for the construction or maintenance of any work of public utility; 
xiv) taxes on vehicles other than motor vehicles; 
xv) tax on professions, trades, callings and employment; 
xvi) tax on  advertisements; 
xvii) school fess; 
xviii) fees on sale of cattle at cattle fairs; 
xix) tax on the annual rental value of buildings and land; 
xx) tax on lands not subject to local rate; 
xxi) tax on hearths; 
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xxii) tax on births, marriages and feasts; 
xxiii) tax on animals; 
xxiv) conservancy rate; 
xxv) fees for erecting buildings; 
xxvi) fees for slaughtering animals 
xxvii) community tax on adult males for public work of general utility; 
xxviii) surcharge on taxes levied by the federal and/or provincial governments; and 
xxix) any other tax levied by the government. 
 Source: World Bank (2000) 
 
